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Q1. I remember I saw you for the first time in the Department of Philosophy of St Andrews 
University. That must have been before 2000, I think. You were a PhD student when I was doing 
my MLitt. Crispin Wright was your supervisor. Could you tell us bit about the topic your PhD 
thesis? 
  
A1. I had originally planned to write about Davidson’s work on truth, and how this related to the 
realism/anti-realism debate, but a few things altered my course. The first was taking a class of 
Crispin’s on the later Wittgenstein, which prompted me to read, and be blown away by, On 
Certainty. The second was reading three excellent books on radical scepticism: Barry Stroud’s The 
Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Michael Williams’ Unnatural Doubts, and Marie 
McGinn’s Sense and Certainty. Collectively they convinced me both that the problem of radical 
scepticism is a deep and important issue and that Wittgenstein can help us to resolve this difficulty. 
Accordingly, I wrote my thesis about how one might understand the Wittgensteinian notion of a 
hinge proposition such that it enables us to answer the radical sceptical problem.  
 
Q2. Could you say a bit more about the understanding of the Wittgensteinian notion of a hinge 
proposition proposed in your PhD thesis. Do you still accept it?  
 
A2. Back then I was convinced that the source of the sceptical problem was epistemic internalism. 
My aim was to try to find a way of reading Wittgenstein which would support this view. 
Wittgenstein clearly thought that one cannot have rational support for one’s most basic 
commitments (i.e., the ‘hinges’), and the standard line is to infer from this that one therefore lacks 
knowledge of them too. But if one is an epistemic externalist—in particular, if one holds that 
knowledge can be possessed even in the absence of supporting rational support—then there is scope 
to reject this entailment. In particular, perhaps the hinge commitments can be known in virtue of 
purely externalist epistemic support. My PhD thesis tried to make good on this claim, and thereby 
offer a way of thinking about hinge commitments such that they were in the market for knowledge, 
albeit never rationally grounded knowledge. There are many advantages to this proposal, 
particularly in the context of radical scepticism, not least that it enables the proponent of a hinge 
epistemology to retain the closure principle for knowledge. I developed this view further in my first 
book, Epistemic Luck (Oxford UP, 2005), where I tried to motivate it within a more general 
methodology that I called anti-luck epistemology, but since then my position on hinge commitments 
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has altered in various ways. Very roughly, I’m no longer convinced that our hinge commitments 
enjoy any epistemic support, whether internalist or externalist. On the plus side, however, I think 
there is a way of thinking about how our hinge commitments can be essentially unknown such that 
this notion can nonetheless make an important contribution to solving the sceptical problem. 
 
Q3. That's really interesting. I'm actually working on hinge propositions and trying to formulate a 
view that put together a notion of acceptance (in Van Fraassen sense) with a form of externalism. 
We should talk more about this. But let's go back to your research. It seems to me that you are 
involved in several research projects presently. Could you tell us something about this?  
 
A3. My most recent project was completing my book on radical scepticism, which appeared a few 
months ago, entitled Epistemic Angst: Radical Scepticism and the Groundlessness of Our 
Believing (Princeton UP, 2015). There are four key parts to this book. The first part claims that the 
Cartesian sceptical problem is really two logically distinct problems in disguise, which each trade 
upon a distinctive sceptical source. The second part claims that there is a way of understanding 
hinge commitments such that although they are essentially unknown (at least with regard to 
rationally grounded knowledge at any rate), they can nonetheless offer us the antidote to one aspect 
of the Cartesian sceptical problem (but not the other). The third part revisits the epistemological 
disjunctivism that I developed in a previous book—see Epistemological Disjunctivism (Oxford UP, 
2012)—and shows how this account presents us with the antidote to the other aspect of the 
Cartesian sceptical problem (but only that aspect). Finally, the fourth part argues that 
epistemological disjunctivism and hinge epistemology, despite being apparently competing 
responses to the Cartesian sceptical problem, are in fact not only compatible but also mutually 
supportive in lots of interesting ways. The result is what I call a biscopic treatment of the sceptical 
problem, one that recognises its dual nature and responds accordingly.  
 
Q4. And do you have other projects, independently of the topic of radical scepticism? Once we had 
a chat about risk… 
 
A4. Yes. Aside from radical scepticism, I’ve been working on a bunch of other inter-related topics. 
For a long time now I’ve been working on the nature of luck, a topic that grew out of the anti-luck 
epistemology that I mentioned earlier. These days I also defend a related view of risk (see my 
2015 Metaphilosophy paper, ‘Risk’). While I think luck and risk are two notions that are closely 
related, I also think that there are some important differences, and that this has implications for a 
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number of domains. For example, I now believe that we should replace an anti-luck epistemology 
with an anti-risk epistemology, and that this enables us to deal with certain objections that have 
been levelled against the former (see my paper, ‘Epistemic Risk’, forthcoming in the Journal of 
Philosophy, for details). I’ve also been applying my account of risk to particular domains, such as 
law and aesthetics (e.g., see my paper ‘Legal Risk, Legal Evidence, and the Arithmetic of Criminal 
Justice’, forthcoming in Jurisprudence). 
 On a related front, I’ve been developing a theory of knowledge that arises out of anti-
luck/risk epistemology, what I call anti-luck virtue epistemology (though it is probably better 
labelled as anti-risk virtue epistemology these days). The core statement of the view is in my paper, 
‘Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology’ (Journal of Philosophy, 2012), but recently I’ve been extending 
the view along a number of fronts. This has involved explaining how it can meet objections, 
showing how knowledge on this proposal relates to other epistemic standings (such as 
understanding, knowledge-how etc), and developing a stance on some related epistemic notions that 
are rooted in this proposal, such as epistemic dependence. A key paper in this regard is one that I 
co-authored with my colleague Jesper Kallestrup where we develop what we call an epistemic twin 
earth argument ('Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth’, European Journal of 
Philosophy, 2014). This is basically a refinement of my earlier critique of so-called robust virtue 
epistemic treatments of knowledge (i.e., views that try to analyse knowledge exclusively in terms of 
the manifestation of virtue, as proposed by Sosa, Greco, Zagzebski and others). 
 
Q5. I know that you are also working in applied epistemology. Can you expand on this? 
 
A5. Yes, I’m increasingly working on topics in applied epistemology. I’ve already noted that I’ve 
been getting interested in legal epistemology. Another topic that I’ve been working on a lot 
concerns the epistemological ramifications of recent movements in cognitive science, particularly 
with regard to technologically-extended (and embedded) cognition, and also group cognition. This 
was something that we have been exploring at Eidyn as part of the AHRC-funded ‘Extended 
Knowledge’ project that I’ve been leading since 2013 (the co-investigators on this project are Andy 
Clark and Jesper Kallestrup). I think this is very much applied epistemology, particularly once one 
starts to think through the practical implications of recent technological developments (e.g., the 
extent to which information is now so easily accessible and often seamlessly incorporated into our 
cognitive practices). This topic dovetails nicely with another applied epistemology interest of mine, 
which is the epistemology of education. In broad terms, the overarching question in this field is 
what the fundamental epistemic goals of education are, and how might one achieve them. My 
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concern has been to motivate a conception of the epistemology of education that has the 
intellectual virtues at its core. In terms of the specific question of extended knowledge, the issue in 
epistemology of education is how best to make sense of our educational practices from an epistemic 
point of view given that students are increasingly technologically extended in their cognitive 
capacities, or else (or in addition) occupy technologically embedded environments. We’ve recently 
been putting these ideas into practice as part of a number of Eidyn’s impact initiatives, particularly 
our philosophy in prisons project, which is devoted to exploring how teaching prisoners critical 
thinking skills, via the teaching of philosophy (and often in virtual learning environments, and 
hence via technologically embedded educational contexts), can enhance their intellectual character 
(and thereby their character more generally). 
 
Q6. You are the Director of the Eidyn Research Centre of the University of Edinburgh. Could you 
please tell us a bit about the Eidyn?  
 
A6. Getting approval for a research centre is no easy feat, at least not at the University of Edinburgh 
anyway. But after the research evaluation exercise in 2008 (‘RAE2008’, as it was known), it 
seemed like the natural next step for Philosophy at Edinburgh, in preparation for the next research 
evaluation exercise (‘REF2014’). The strategy that we developed was for a research centre that in 
the first instance showcased our research in the specific areas of ethics, epistemology and 
philosophy of mind and cognitive science, but which, if successful, would then broaden its remit to 
represent Edinburgh’s philosophical research as a whole, at least post-REF2014. Eidyn was 
eventually established in 2012. I’m pleased to say that it has far exceeded the goals that we set for it 
when it was proposed. We have hosted over 30 projects, with most of these externally funded (the 
rest were pilot projects, many of which have lead in due course to large externally funded projects). 
The centre is currently directed by myself, with Jesper Kallestrup and Michela Massimi as Deputy 
Directors. 
There are three distinctive features of Eidyn. The first is the extent to which the research 
projects we host are often highly interdisciplinary, taking in such subject areas as Psychology, 
Informatics, Classics, History, Linguistics, and so on. The second is that from the off Eidyn had a 
strong concern for finding ways for the research we produce to have impact beyond the academy, 
not just in terms of public engagement but also more specifically in terms of concrete effects on, for 
example, public policy (the ‘Philosophy in Prisons’ project that I mentioned earlier, and which I 
lead, is a good case in point). The third distinctive feature of Eidyn is that it was (unusually, for a 
research centre) part of its remit to contribute to innovative ways of developing research-led 
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teaching, and to cascade this expertise throughout the curriculum at all levels. So, for 
example, Eidyn has been at the vanguard of developing online educational initiatives, such as high-
profile MOOCs (=massive open online courses)—our ‘Introduction to Philosophy’ MOOC is one of 
the world’s most-popular online courses, and will soon pass 1M enrolments—and a highly 
successful distinctive research-led online MSc in ‘Epistemology, Ethics, and Mind’. In developing 
this new kind of pedagogy, we’ve compiled a database of online resources which are available for 
anyone to use (http://videos.philosophy.ed.ac.uk), particularly schools, thereby further enhancing 
the impact of what we do outside of the academy. Thanks to generous funding from the Templeton 
foundation, we are now working on creating a suite of new MOOCs, and also a new online MSc 
(joint with the School of Divinity) on ‘Philosophy, Science, and Religion’.  
 
Q7. Final question: could you please tell me what projects is Eidyn running presently? 
 
A6. We’re currently hosting over 20 projects, so I will need to be selective! Eidyn has recently been 
awarded two major ERC grants, so I’ll start with those. Michela Massimi leads an ERC 
Consolidator Grant (c. €1.6M) entitled, ‘Perspectival Realism: Science, Knowledge, and Truth 
From a Human Vantage Point’. This project develops a novel view in philosophy of science called 
perspectival realism, via a three-pronged highly interdisciplinary approach, which combines 
the philosophy of science, with scientific practice, the history of science and the history of 
philosophy. In addition, we’ve recently heard that Andy Clark has been awarded an ERC Advanced 
Grant (c. €1.4M) entitled, ‘Expecting Ourselves: Embodied Prediction and the Construction of 
Conscious Experience’ (or ‘XSPECT’ for short). This project examines the philosophical 
implications of an important new movement in cognitive science, predictive coding. Other projects 
that we host include Laura Candiotto’s Marie Curie Individual Fellowship (‘Emotions First: The 
Role of Emotions in Reasoning’, c. €185K), Mark Sprevak’s large AHRC project in collaboration 
with colleagues in English and Classics (‘A History of Distributed Cognition’, c. £600K), and the 
Edinburgh wing of a major new European Commission Marie Skłodowska-Curie ITN European 
Training Network (‘DIAPHORA: Philosophical Problems, Resilience and Persistent 
Disagreement’, c. €3.7M). You can find out more about Eidyn’s projects on our webpage 
(http://eidyn.ppls.ed.ac.uk/projects).    
 
 
